Tuesday, 5 April 2016

Airing some prejudices: on one-dimensional vs 2-dimensional games

A year ago I provoked a bit of a discussion on the Pendraken Miniatures Forum about the limitations or otherwise of wargaming pre-Napoleonic battles, under the title "Is everything pre-Napoleon really linear and limited?". A similar debate has been going on for the past couple of days on The Miniatures Page. Looking back over last year's exchanges I think they merit airing again. So indulge me while I reprise my original post for your amusement or ire, as applicable.


The spark that ignited the flames was when I posted to a thread on "Wargaming pet hates". My own list of pet hates included:
"Anything pre-Napoleon - essentially it's linear warfare, relatively limited tactical options, relatively few interesting decisions to make."

Bored, bored, bored ...

(I was also careful to include this caveat: "I don't mean to belittle anyone else's fun - it's all about personal preference, and if others love the games I hate, that's fine, I don't have to play them.")

But having made such a contentious statement, I had better try to justify it. Let me give a grossly generalized characterization of pre-Napoleonic warfare (PNW). With few exceptions, realistically the interesting decisions a PNW general has to make are limited to pre-battle ones:

- How do I deploy my line? (For it is almost invariably a line.)
- Should I have a second line and/or a reserve?
- Do I attack the enemy or wait for them?
- If I attack, do I go left-flanking, right-flanking, or general advance?

The decisions a PNW general can make during the battle are more limited:
- When/where to commit the second line / reserve?
- Er, that's it?

This is because the capabilities of the troops and the armies are so limited, in particular their mobility and firepower.

The mobility of most infantry formations is incredibly limited, even into the mid-18th century, because weapon technologies mostly oblige infantry to fight in unwieldy masses, which can't cope with difficult terrain, and because drill movements for quick formation changes haven't been invented. Artillery is virtually immobile.

Firepower is either very feeble or very short-ranged. The longer-ranged weapons are too few and not destructive enough to matter much.

Because both mobility and firepower are so limited, the distance to which units and armies can project their force is much less than the width of the armies. Thus, although linear deployments are not exactly one-dimensional - there are second and third lines and reserves - they are not truly two-dimensional either.

Whereas around Napoleon's time, several different developments come into play. Artillery becomes lighter and more mobile, while at the same time becoming more accurate and effective, and also more numerous. Sophisticated drill means formation changes become rapid enough to be performed closer to the enemy than before, and enable obstacles to be bypassed more easily. Transitions between line-column-square are all easily performed, giving commanders more options. Command and control becomes more sophisticated and professional, and the corps system is developed, in which fractions of the army become combined-arms mini-armies, each capable of performing independent yet coordinated missions.

All these factors contribute to give the battlefield much more depth and make it truly two-dimensional. The fact that armies can now project force across greater distances - either longer-ranged artillery, or more rapidly-moving forces of all arms - and that they can cope better with moving across or around difficult terrain makes for much more complex interactions across much larger areas than in linear PNW.

The consequence as far as I'm concerned is that the more complex interactions of the C19 and C20 mean there are far more decisions to be made in the course of a C19 or C20 wargame than in PNW, and that C19 onwards is therefore for me personally, relatively - and note I did say relatively - much more interesting and fun to wargame, and much more likely to provide the full High Quality Gaming Experience.

That's the gist of my argument in a fairly large nutshell. I mean no offence to anyone who disagrees, and I will be happy to be disabused of my ignorant and prejudiced notions. Actually, I hope that some PNW experts will open my eyes by pointing out numerous historical instances that undermine my argument. Please educate me!*

*If you visit the Pendraken thread you will see that plenty of people responded - but they didn't really dent my prejudices. But I think we all ended up friends anyway (make sure to read my last message on the thread as well).

9 comments:

  1. I can see your point as some of the 18thC battles were one of manouevre and frankly not much action. However having played many games of 'Honours of War', I've found that the seven Years War to be great fun and challenging to play in its own way. I was even suprised at how I enjoyed playing the '45 Rebellion, again with the 'Honours of War' rules.

    Compare this to playing Nappies with 'Black Powder' rules and everything moves so fast as if on steroids. Personally I prefer the sYW as it fits in with my gaming style. Each to their own I suppose.

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  2. Thanks, Steve. I was exaggerating for effect - I certainly don't "hate" PNW games, there is plenty of fun to be had from them. In fact I hope to get another 'Honours of War' game in myself before too long.

    On the TMP thread there were a couple of astute observations. One was just that the choice of rules makes a big difference. The other was about 'resource management'. In PNW games the interesting decisions may be less about the 2D manoeuvring, and more about how you manage the morale and good order of your successive lines. Good rules will enable you to make those kinds of decisions in a fun / interesting / realistic way. I've noted before that I think that's a strength of HoW.

    Chris

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  3. Gamers quite frequently proclaim that you can't possibly write an effective rules set to cover broad swaths of history because warfare is so different. They somehow just didn't fight the same way. Really?! I will contend just the opposite. We have 3 distinct periods that we can write rules for. Sword and bow, horse and musket and modern. Sword and spear differs be sub period only by army and command structure (or lack there of). Ultimately, men advance upon one another while the lighter troops deliver a hail of arrows upon the enemy. Whether it is 1000BC or 1500AD, the style of battle is the same. Working in the little details to make the period work is all you need.

    Horse and musket (1660 to 1900?) is just that. Men ride horses and butcher the enemy at close range or are met with a bloody repulse. Infantry, whether they have matchlock or musket, deliver well aimed volleys at the enemy and hopefully will drive them off with a well timed charge. Linear warfare (that which you are not fond of) is not terribly different from the later periods (Napoleonic and up). The differences lay in the command structure and organization (I've heard that somewhere before). But ultimately, it is still about firepower. Range is the limiting factor. But the ranges did not change for more than 100 years. From 1700 through 1815, 100 yards was still the maximum effective range of a weapon. Smoke was a real problem on the battlefield. The ability of the army to maneuver changed somewhat with Napoleonic tactics. But a certain English army still used linear tactics throughout the war...and won. There are plenty of battles throughout the 18th century that demonstrate the surprisingly high degree of maneuverability of infantry on the battlefield. Cannon through much of the 18th century were quite mobile. The
    battalion gun was used in many armies through the Napoleonic wars giving some firepower on demand. I have to tell you, even the ACW was really 18th century warfare fought over greater ranges. With rifling, 300 yards became the maximum effective range. But the line was the way to go. Assaults were carried out in waves. Sound familiar? The American army of that period almost certainly was drilled to be more maneuverable. They were a hybrid army not too different from Wellington's army which in turn was a hybrid of the 18th century army.

    I won't go into modern because we hopefully can agree that it is a different animal entirely. ;)

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  4. John, many thanks for such a thoughtful response.

    It's true that the changes I highlighted didn't all happen overnight, nor all at the same time. During and after the Seven Years War, artillery became more numerous, more mobile, more effective; infantry drill movements evolved to enable infantry to change formation more rapidly. But it took time for these developments to happen, and more time for them to become widely adopted and effectively implemented.

    I would suggest that Napoleon's genius lies in part in recognising that the rules had changed, and in exploiting them effectively. More mobile and flexible infantry and artillery enable more independent manoeuvre by smaller combined-arms formations - the corps system. He adopted this first and best and consequently overwhelmed slower opponents.

    You mention the English linear army winning. Actually it lost a lot, for a long time. It only caught up when Wellington started fighting in a modern way. (I'll post separately about this because of character limits!)

    As for ACW, yes, lower level formations fought in lines, but the way in which divisions and corps were flung around the battlefield bears no resemblance to PNW battles.

    So I stand by my argument that the Napoleonic era is one of pivotal change.

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    1. And here is more detail about the British army in the Napoleonic period:

      I reckon for the British army the change happens in Spain, under Wellington, between 1809 and 1812. A fair summary here:
      http://napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/foreigners_British_army.htm#britisharmy2
      ===
      "The only British overall military success of the period was in Spain. Most other British operation were a failure: Flanders in 1793-94; Holland in 1799; Buenos Aires twice; Holland in 1809; the Dardenelles in 1807; Egypt in 1806; Spain and Sweden in 1808; Naples and Hanover in 1805; Spain and Italy in 1800.
      The redcoats went against Washington and won at Bladensburg and North Point but suffered heavier losses to US forces made up largely of militia. The British at New Orleans had six excellent Peninsular regiments (4th, 7th, 43d, 44th, 85th, and 95th Rifles) and failed spectacularly against the Americans. The outcome of New Orleans is good evidence of a good army being led badly.
      In 1793-1794 the British troops in Holland received "scathing criticism from foreign military observers and Allied commanders. There were damning comments on the appalling behaviour of officers, their lack of care for their men and their generally drunken demeanour. The Army as a whole showed up badly in the field. The drill manuals were out of date, the battalions were of poor quality ..." (Haythornthwaite - "Wellington's Infantry (1)" p 6)
      The war in Spain was also not a litghtining campaign. In 1809 the British corps under general Moore fled before Napoleon to the sea. "The track was littered for mile after mile with discarded equipment and knapsacks, and the forlorn dead and dying." (Haythorntwaite - "Wellington's Infantry (1)" p 36)"
      ===

      All Wellington’s major battles before Salamanca were fairly simple cases of linear defence repelling French assaults:
      Vimeiro
      Talavera
      Bussaco
      Fuentes de Onoro
      The battle of Albuera in 1811 is a case of a detached corps operating under Beresford.

      But at Salamanca in 1812, Wellington won not just by skilful defence but by a well-timed and rapid advance of his right wing to attack the French in their flank. The map here
      http://www.antiquaprintgallery.com/ekmps/shops/richben90/images/battle-of-salamanca-22nd-july-1812.-spain.-napoleonic-wars-1848-map-211869-p.jpg
      shows British formations advancing in columns (before deploying into fighting lines).

      I’d say in the Peninsular War, Wellington and his army learned in 3 years of sustained campaigning how to operate as a modern army. Wellington was able to choose subordinates he trusted and could rely on to understand what he wanted them to do.

      The Waterloo Campaign is quite a good illustration of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussians operating modern corps-based armies. Wellington had two corps. The I Corps, under the Prince of Orange, was about 10 miles from II Corps on 15 and 16 June, and its own component divisions were also dispersed. On 16 June I Corps fought the battle of Quatre Bras, after which it retreated and united with II Corps at Waterloo. Meanwhile the Prussians were defeated at Ligny, but whereas a traditional army would have felt compelled to retire NE along its supply line, away from Wellington – which was what Napoleon hoped – it marched north and stayed close enough to help him. On the day of Waterloo, a single corps of the Prussian army at Wavre was able to keep Grouchy’s French at bay long enough for other Prussian corps to come to Wellington’s aid at Waterloo.

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  5. Very good write up Chris! I learned something new today. ;)

    I think Wellingtons "genius" at Waterloo had less to do with his tactics and more to do with taking advantage of his opportunities. Had Grouchey pursued more vigorously, The Prussians might very well have not shown up. Wellington loses a battle of attrition. Similarly, had Grouchey recognized that he good and well messed up and marched back toward Napoleon, the battle could have been lost by shear numbers and Napoleon may have won in good style. Napoleon delayed the Guard's assault because he didn't trust Ney (the guy that took Wellington to the mat just days before at Quatre Bras) and that allowed Wellington to solidify his center with his last reserves. So many little things could have decided that one differently. But they didn't and here we are. Probably a better world for it.

    I think there are a lot of good things to be said about 18th century linear warfare. I will admit that a game of the scale of BBB, it would probably be kind of dull.

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  6. Thanks, John - glad you liked my write up!

    Certainly plenty of what-ifs around Waterloo, which is a big part of why wargamers like it. Wellington himself described it as "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life".

    BBB players have actually been talking recently about using BBB for C18 battles. I think with a few simple but significant tweaks it could capture the essence of 18th century warfare. It might even be fun to play!

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    1. I think you would almost have to scale it down to a regimental level unless you were playing some of the truly massive battles of the WSS. Malplaquet, for instance, would be a fine candidate with something like 90,000 troops on each side engaged.

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    2. Well obviously I'd want to do the big ones! Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, and a swathe of SYW actions. Could keep me busy for a while if I did get into it.

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Comments welcome!